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Beyond Narrative Disclosure Tone: The Upper Echelons Theory Perspective 
Abstract:  
   This study investigates the key drives of narrative tone in the UK context where managers have 
more flexibility to frame narratives with stakeholders. While prior studies examined firm-specific 
characteristics as determinants of narrative tone, the current study employs the upper echelons theory 
and focusses on top managers’ characteristics. Using computerised textual analysis, our findings 
suggest that both observed and unobserved CEOs characteristics drive positive tone in the UK context 
and this relationship is moderated by corporate governance attributes. Specifically, older, female and 
financial expert CEOs display less positive tone. Considering psychological features, we find that 
narcissistic CEOs are more likely to display positive tone compared with non-narcissistic CEOs, 
however, this relationship declines in firms that have a higher independent board. Moreover, we found 
audit committee and board independence are negatively associated with positive tone. Additionally, 
we found more females on board increases the negative relationship between female CEOs and 
positive tone. These results have significant implications for top management, policy makers, 
regulators and the users of financial reporting. 
 
 
Keywords: Narrative tone, Textual analysis, CEO characteristics, Corporate Governance, Upper 
echelons theory. 












1. Introduction:  
    Narratives play an important role in conveying information from managers to external users 
(Loughran and Mcdonald, 2016; Merkley, 2014). Prior accounting and financial reporting studies 
investigated several types of narrative disclosure, such as risk disclosure (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015; Ibrahim and Hussainey, 2019), Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) disclosure (e.g., Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang, 
2011), and Forward-Looking disclosure (e.g., Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; Schleicher 
and Walker, 2010). However, it is important to investigate not only what the information in such a 
context is, but also how it is being presented to external users (Pennebaker, Mehl and Niederhoffer, 
2003; Blankespoor, 2018). This motivates us to focus on Narrative Disclosure Tone (NDT). 
    Tone refers to how information is linguistically, positive vs. negative, presented to external users 
in narrative reporting (Henry and Leone, 2016; Loughran and McDonald, 2016). The great majority 
of NDT studies investigated tone consequences and how it affects market reaction, stock volatility 
and firm performance (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Kothari, Li and Short, 2009; Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat 
and Segal, 2010; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012; Davis, Piger, and Sedor, 2012; Price, Doran, Peterson 
and Bliss, 2012; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003: Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2014; Yekini, Wisniewski 
and Millo, 2016; Boudt, Thewissen and Torsin, 2018; Barakat, ashby, Fenn and Bryce, 2019; 
Rahman, 2019). However, studies of NDT determinants are limited (Marquez‑Illescas, Zebedee and 
Zhou, 2019; Loughran and McDonald, 2016; Davis, Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2015). Therefore, 
this study aims to investigate the key factors that drive NDT by responding to the call of 
Marquez‑Illescas et al., (2019) which is asking for more research about NDT determinants.  
    While prior researchers examined firm-specific characteristics as determinants of NDT (e.g., Li, 
2010; Iatridis, 2016), in the current study we move from firm-specific characteristics to top managers’ 
characteristics. This point of view is supported by upper echelons theory, which states that strategic 
choices and firms’ outcomes are predicted by their top managers’ characteristics (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Although Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are not involved directly in preparing 
financial reports, they determine the tone of the top, which affects the decisions of different managers 
(Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). Therefore, we consider CEO observed personalities (age, gender, 
and financial expertise), unobserved psychological features (narcissism) and Corporate Governance 
(CG) mechanisms as determinants of NDT. Given the importance of these arguments, we propose 
that such characteristics might be reflected in corporate narrative tone. Moreover, it can be moderated 
by CG mechanisms, which play an important role in monitoring financial reporting process and in 
declining impression management in narrative reporting (Iatridis, 2016).  
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  It is worth mentioning that most of the NDT studies used US data, however, more evidence from 
outside the US is still needed (Yekini et al., 2016; Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019). Therefore, we 
provide evidence from the UK context that operates under the principles-based approach, which gives 
managers more flexibility to frame narratives with stakeholders compared with the US where the 
rules-based approach is applied (Yekini et al., 2016).   
    Using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, we employ a computerised textual analysis for 
UK annual reports narratives, after excluding auditor reports and notes of financial statements, to 
measure the tone. Our final sample consists of 2,437 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2018. We 
chose Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlists because it is created based on a financial document; 
therefore, it is more applicable to financial reporting and business communication research (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2016). Following psychological literature we measure narcissism using the first-
person pronounce usage (Alli, Nicolaides and Craig, 2018; Libby, Kristina and Rennekamp, 2012). 
We focus on annual reports as they provide the largest sample of corporate narrative reporting which 
can represent corporate narrative style (Wisniewski and Yekini, 2015; Yekini et al., 2016).  
   Our findings show that both observed and unobserved CEO characteristics and CG mechanisms 
drive NDT in the UK context as older CEOs, female CEOs and CEOs with financial experience 
display less positive tone in annual report narratives. Additionally, narcissistic CEOs are more likely 
to have a positive tone compared with non-narcissistic CEOs. Moreover, we found companies with a 
high independence level of board of directors and audit committee have less positive tone in their 
narrative reporting. Considering the moderation influences of CG, we found the positive tone of 
narcissistic CEOs is lower when firms have a higher board independence percentage. In addition, we 
found more females on a board increases the negative relationship between female CEOs and positive 
tone. That is in line with business ethics research suggesting that a higher female percentage on board 
is associated with appointing a female leader and supporting their decisions as it reduces the gender 
gap effect between the CEO and the board of directors (Wang and Kelen, 2013). 
    Our study makes several contributions to financial reporting literature. First, it adds to the debate 
on key factors that drive NDT by highlighting CEOs’ personalities, psychological feature and 
financial expertise as new dimensions of NDT determinants. Second, it sheds light on the important 
role of strong CG attributes in moderating the positive tone of CEOs. In particular, it shows the role 
of independent boards in moderating the positive tone of narcissistic CEOs, also, how females on a 
board affect the tone of female CEOs. Third, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first in the 
UK context to provide supporting evidence from upper echelons theory that CEOs’ characteristics 
affect NDT, where the principles-based approach is operated with less restrictive financial reporting 
style compared with the US context.  
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    The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature in NDT and 
hypotheses development, while the methodology and research design are presented in section 3, and 
section 4 focusses on data sources and sample selection. The results of our empirical analysis and 
robustness checks are shown in section 5. Finally, section 6 offers the conclusion of the current study 
and implications.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development:  
2.1 Prior studies of NDT determinants:  
    A few studies have investigated the factors that drive the tone of narrative reporting, however, these 
studies are limited. Li (2010) used the Naïve Bayesian machine learning approach to examine the 
content of MD&A section in 10-Q and 10-K filings. He found that firms of a small size, old age, 
better performance, less volatility and lower accruals are more likely to have a more optimistic tone 
in their forward-looking statements. Similarly, Schleicher and Walker (2010) examined how 
managers use tone in their forward-looking statements (FLS) in the outlook section of the UK annual 
reports. They found that companies with a declining performance are more likely to bias the tone 
upwards. In addition, they reported that, risky companies and companies that have analyst earnings 
expectations display a more optimistic tone. Moreover, Schleicher (2012) found that positive FLS are 
real-good news when they are related more to sales and comparisons with the previous year’s results; 
otherwise, it is just tone management. 
   Iatridis (2016) aimed to examine accounting strategies and choices as determinants of tone in UK 
narrative reporting. He found companies with lower earning manipulations, lower cost of capital, 
high conservatism, and high growth have a more pessimistic tone in their annual reports narratives. 
Moreover, Davis et al., (2015) reported that managers who have previous experience in charity 
organisations are more likely to use a more positive tone. In a different way, Lee and Park (2019) 
found that audit committees with more financial expertise reduce the abnormal optimistic tone in 
MD&A section in the US context. In addition, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) considered analysts’ 
expectations as determinants of narrative tone. They found firms that beat the analyst’s expectation 
and companies with high growth ratio display less pessimistic language in US press releases. 
   Recently, using experiments with experienced managers, Asay, Libby and Rennekamp (2018) 
found CEOs highlight positive information by making it more readable. In addition, they discuss poor 
performance in a positive way by focussing on future plans. However, managers use less readable, 
more passive sentences in the case of negative news. Moreover, DeBoskey, Luo and Zhou (2019) 
found a positive association between CEO power and optimistic tone in US earnings announcement. 
As they found, longer CEO tenure and having rule duality increase the optimistic tone. However, 
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CEO tenure has less effect on narrative tone when the company has efficient corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, other CEO characteristics might be more related to the tone settings such as 
narcissism and financial expertise, which we investigate in the current study.  
   The current study is different from prior studies that have investigated CEO characteristics and 
NDT (e.g., Marquez-Illescas et al., 2019; DeBoskey et al., 2019) as follows. First, it discusses 
different characteristics of CEOs, such as age, gender and financial expertise. Second, it investigates 
not only how CEOs' characteristics might affect NDT, but also the moderation effect of CG 
mechanisms on this relationship. Third, while the great majority of tone studies examined the US 
context, the current study provides evidence from the UK, which represents the principle-based 
approach context where managers have more freedom to frame narratives compared with the US 
context with more restrictive regulations. Finally, it focusses on annual reports as they provide the 
largest sample of narrative reporting which can represent corporate narrative style compared with 
other financial reporting documents such as press releases and conference calls (Yekini et al., 2016). 
2.2 Hypotheses development:  
    According to the previous discussion, it is noticeable that prior studies about the determinants of 
NDT investigated the tone of a specific kind of disclosure, such as the tone of forward-looking 
disclosure (e.g., Li, 2010; Schleicher and Walker). Alternatively, they considered firm-specific 
characteristics and firm accounting strategies, such as earning management and accounting 
conservatism, as determinants of tone (e.g., Iatridis, 2016; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012). However, 
in the current study we move from firm-specific characteristics to top managers’ characteristics, 
considering CEOs’ personal and psychological characteristics as determinants of NDT. That can be 
explained by upper echelons theory, which states that strategic choices and firms’ outcomes are 
predicted by their top managers’ characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
2.2.1 CEO characteristics: 
    Managers have a key role in choosing a firm’s strategy and decision-making as their objective is 
to increase the wealth of their investors (Amernic and Craig, 2010). Consistently, upper echelons 
theory argues that a firm’s outcomes can be predicted by their top managers’ characteristics 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Although the CEOs of companies are 
not involved directly in preparing financial reports, they determine the tone of the top, which affects 
the decisions of different managers (Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). We classify CEO characteristics 




2.2.1.1 CEO observed characteristics:   
  2.2.1.1.1 CEO age:  
    Recently, some physiological research suggested that older individuals are more conscientiousness 
as they are more responsible compared with younger individuals, therefore, they might provide a 
neutral and fair description for a firm’s performance (Ashton and Lee, 2016). Moreover, older CEOs 
are more likely to have conservatism and cautious strategies in their decision making process 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1985). In addition, Huang, Rose-Green and Lee (2012) found positive 
association between CEO age and financial reporting quality. Moreover, previous literature found 
that CEO age is positively associated with risk aversion and negatively associated with stock volatility 
(Serfling, 2014). McClelland, III and Oh (2012) reported younger CEOs lead to lower future 
performance in the US as they argued that older CEOs have more experience to improve firm 
performance. According to the previous discussion, such a characteristic might be reflected in 
corporate narrative tone as more conservatism and risk aversion may lead to less optimistic tone. 
Therefore, the current study expects companies with older CEOs to have less positive tone in their 
narrative reporting. 
H1a: Companies with older CEOs display less positive tone in UK corporate annual report narratives. 
2.2.1.1.2 CEO Gender:  
   Recently, the gender of CEOs has been widely investigated in financial reporting literature. 
According to business ethics literature, genders behave differently in their decision-making, values 
and interests. Also, they have different responsibilities, understanding and risk preferences (Habib 
and Hossain, 2013; Zalata, Ntlm, Aboud and Gyapong, 2018). Men are more interested in increasing 
the economic benefits and have more probability of breaking the rules in order to achieve great 
success. However, female managers are more ethical in their attitude and decision-making (Butz and 
Lewis, 1996; Mason and Mudrack, 1996). Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai (2011) argue that having female 
directors enhances shareholder value and leads to better organisational outcomes. 
    In addition, Dunn (2010) found females are more likely to overestimate and realise their 
responsibilities as a CEO compared to men. Whereas there is other evidence that female CEOs are 
more likely to be risk avoiders, follow conservative strategies and are less likely to be involved in 
earning management strategies (Zalata et al., 2018A; Davis et al., 2015; Palvia et al. 2015; Peni and 
Vahamaa 2010). Moreover, Ho, Li, Tam and Zhang (2015) found female CEOs have a strong ethical 
nature, which leads to a better level of honesty in their financial reporting compared to male CEOs. 
Consistent with these findings, Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) found that companies with female 
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CEOs have less earnings volatility and leverage ratios compared with male CEOs. According to the 
previous discussion, it is noticeable that female CEOs are more risk avoiders, which can be reflected 
in narrative reporting. Therefore, the current study expects companies with female CEOs to have less 
positive tone in their narrative reporting.  
H1b: Companies with female CEOs display less positive tone in UK corporate annual report 
narratives.  
    Moreover, the current study proposes that the effect of a female CEO on positive tone is likely to 
be moderated by board gender diversity. In particular, we argue that the effect of a female CEO on 
positive tone is likely to be stronger when there is a higher percentage of females on the board of 
directors. We based this argument on business ethics research suggesting that a higher percentage of 
females on board plays an important role in appointing a female leader for the company, as that might 
reduce the gender gap effect between the CEO and the board of directors (e.g., Wang and Kelen, 
2013). In addition, it is important to consider the interdependencies between the top management 
team as it affects the firm’s outcomes (Plöckinger et al., 2016).  
H1b1: the relationship between female CEOs and positive tone is moderated by the percentage of 
females on board.  
2.2.1.1.3CEO financial expertise: 
     Financial expertise is one of the most important attributes to monitor firm performance and a 
company’s mechanisms (Zalata, Tauringana and Tingbani, 2018). Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004) 
argued that to be able to understand the financial reporting and financial decision consequences, 
managers should have a financial experience. Moreover, Custódio and Metzger (2014) found that 
CEOs with a financial experience are more able in their communication with investors because they 
understand what they need. While the majority of previous studies focussed on higher education and 
CEOs with a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree (e.g., Lin, Lin, Song and Li, 2011; 
Bamber, Jiang and Wang, 2010), Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) argue that CEOs’ financial expertise 
might play a key role in financial reporting quality. They found CEOs with a financial experience are 
less likely to be involved in earning management strategies compared with non-financial expert 
CEOs.  
    Moreover, CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more likely to follow conservative strategies in 
their financial decisions (Bamber, John, and Yanyan, 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010). 
Similarly, Jiang, Zhu, and Huang (2013) found CEOs with financial expertise reduce real earning 
management and they disclose higher quality earning information. According to the previous 
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discussion, CEOs with a financial experience follow more conservative strategies, therefore, the 
current study expects companies with financial expertise CEOs to have less positive tone in their 
narrative reporting. 
H1c: Companies with financial expertise CEOs display less positive tone in UK corporate annual 
report narratives. 
2.2.1.2 CEO unobserved feature (Narcissism):  
    In the last decade, there was a growing interest to study the effect of narcissistic CEOs in 
management, leadership and organisational studies as one of the CEO features (Wales, Patel and 
Lumpkin, 2013). Olsen, Dworkis and Young (2014) reported that the psychology literature defined 
narcissism as  people who fall in love with themselves and with their own reflections as a kind of 
self-admiration. According to upper echelons theory, narcissistic CEOs choose different types of 
strategies compared with other CEOs as they found narcissistic CEOs prefer bold actions, which 
attract attention, regardless of whether these result in big gains or big losses (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007; Buchholz, Jaeschke, Lopatta and Maas, 2018). In other words, the performance of 
firms which are led by a narcissistic CEO is not better nor worse than other firms because they just 
focus on the bold action whether it leads to a better performance or not. 
    Supporting this argument, Olsen et al., (2014) found positive financial performance from 
narcissistic CEOs. However, Ham, Seybert and Wang, (2018) reported negative association between 
CEO narcissism and firm performance and financial position. In addition, they reported that firms, 
which have narcissistic CEOs, are more likely to have lower profitability and cash flows. Recently, 
Marquez‑Illescas et al., (2019) found narcissistic CEOs are more likely to use more optimistic tone 
in their narrative reporting compared to non-narcissistic CEOs, but this relationship is weaker in firms 
with older CEOs. However, our study adds to this research by examining if strong CG mechanisms 
moderate the tone of CEOs.  
   The great majority of prior studies and the upper echelons theory agreed that narcissistic CEOS aim 
to take attention and focus on bold actions. Consequently, this study expects that narcissistic CEOs 
will have more optimistic tone in their narrative reporting and follow more impression management 
strategies regardless of whether their companies display a good performance or not during the 
previous year (Ham et al., 2018; Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019; Amernic and Craig, 2010). 
H2: Narcissistic CEOs are more likely to use positive tone in their narrative reporting compared with 
other CEOs in the UK context.   
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       Moreover, the current study argues that the effect of narcissistic CEOs on positive tone can be 
moderated by board independence. In other words, we expect that the effect of narcissistic CEOs on 
positive tone is likely to be lower in the case of a higher independent board of directors. As an 
independent board represents strong CG mechanisms and increases the governance-monitoring role 
of executives in order to improve financial reporting quality (Iatridis, 2016; Osma and Guillamo´n-
Saorı´n, 2011).  
H2a: The positive effect of narcissistic CEOs on positive tone is lower in firms with a higher board 
independence percentage. 
2.2.2 CG mechanisms:  
   Strong and efficient CG improves the quality of financial reporting. In addition, it increases the 
transparency and decreases the scepticism of investors (Li, 2010; Iatridis, 2016; Melloni, Stacchezzini 
and Lai, 2016). Therefore, CG mechanisms should be considered as important factors that drive NDT.  
2.2.2.1 Audit committee independence:  
    The Audit Committee (AC) has an important role in monitoring the financial reporting progress 
(Zalata et al., 2018B). Therefore, it is important to consider the characteristics of AC while 
investigating financial reporting in general and narrative characteristics in particular such as tone. 
Mangena and Pike (2005) found a positive association between AC characteristics, such as financial 
expertise and committee independence, with the level of disclosure in interim reports, as independent 
AC would be more efficient in monitoring financial reporting process.  
    In the UK context, Smith Committee Report (2003) states that audit committees should revise 
companies’ control systems and risk management as part of their role in monitoring the financial 
reporting process. In addition, Melloni et al., (2016) found a negative relationship between AC 
independence and impression management in business model reports. That means independent AC 
can control impression management strategies. Therefore, the current research expects more 
independent AC will control positive tone in narratives.  
H3a: There is a negative significant association between audit committee independence and positive 
tone in corporate annual report narratives. 
2.2.2.2 Board independence:  
    The independence of the board of directors is an important indicator for a strong CG and it is widely 
used to examine the efficiency of CG mechanisms (Iatridis, 2016). An independent board increases 
the efficiency of the board in decision making, monitoring roles and choosing the best choices of the 
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company (Melloni et al., 2016). Independent directors are more likely to provide executive directors 
with independent advice without any conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, there 
are some empirical studies that supported this argument proving that an independent board decreases 
impression management (Osma and Guillamo´n-Saorı´n, 2011). Moreover, Liao, Luo and Tang 
(2015) proved that boards that are more independent have more tendency to increase the transparency 
in their disclosure. Consequently, this study expects that an independent board of directors will 
control the positive tone of narratives.  
H3b: There is a negative significant association between board independence and positive tone in 
UK corporate annual report narratives.  
2.2.2.3 Board gender diversity:  
   In the last decade, board diversity was identified as one of the most effective mechanisms to 
improve CG by providing more experiences, different opinions and alternative perspectives (Zhou, 
Kara and Molyneux, 2019; Poletti-Hughes and Briano-Turrent, 2019). In particular, gender diversity 
on board received more attention from regulators and started to be considered as an important 
indicator of CG efficiency. The financial reporting council in their Guidance on Board Effectiveness 
argues that gender diversity increases options variety in decision-making and gives more experience 
variety (FRC, 2011). Moreover, the UK Corporate Governance code highlights the importance of 
gender diversity as part of efficient CG structure (The code, 2016). 
   In addition, empirical studies provided evidence about the usefulness of having a high female 
percentage on the board of directors. Females on board affect firm effectiveness and improve a 
company’s reputation, and it has a significant positive effect on firm performance and corporate 
governance (Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin, 2009). Similarly, a greater female percentage on the 
board decreases impression management as female directors disclose neutral information (García-
Sánchez, Suárez-Fernández and Martínez-Ferrero, 2018; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010). 
Moreover, Gul et al., (2011) proved that female directors are more ethical in their decisions and 
financial reporting style. According to the previous discussion, it is obvious that board gender 
diversity plays an important role in decreasing impression management strategies. Therefore, the 
current study expects firms with a high percentage of females on board to have less positive tone in 
their narrative disclosure.  
H3c: There is a negative significant association between the percentage of femaleson the board of 




3. Methodology:  
3.1 Tone measurement:  
   Since our main objective of the current study is to identify the key factors that drive NDT in the 
UK context, we employ a computerised textual analysis using bag-of-words approach with software 
called CFIE to measure the tone. We chose to use CFIE because it is created especially for the UK 
PDF structure annual reports (Haj, Alves, Rayson, Walker and Young, 2020). CFIE software is 
similar to Diction software; it converts the PDF files to text, therefore, it will be ready for textual 
analysis using the chosen wordlist. The bag-of-words approach has been commonly used in textual 
analysis studies in general, and the tone of narratives studies in particular (e.g., Yekini et al., 2016; 
Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019; Lee and Park, 2019). This approach aims to measure the word 
frequency in a document based on a list of words representing the examined phenomenon divided by 
the total number of words in the document (Henry and Leone, 2016). 
   According to tone literature, there are four main wordlists that have been widely used to capture the 
word frequency of positive (negative) tone named as, Harvard GI, Diction, Henry (2008) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlists (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). Following the majority 
of tone studies (e.g., Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012; Feldman et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2014; 
Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019; Lee and Park, 2019), the current study uses Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) wordlist to measure positive tone, for two reasons. First, it is created based on a financial 
document, named 10-K filings, and therefore, it is more applicable to financial reporting and business 
communication research than other general dictionaries such as Harvard or Diction (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016). Second, it is more comprehensive as it contains 354 positive and 2,329 negative 
words compared with Henry (2008) wordlist, which contains 104 positive words and 85 negative 
words. Although Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist is created based on the US context, 10-K 
filings, it is still applicable to be used in the UK context as it does not contain words related to culture 
or regulations (Yekini et al., 2016). Therefore, positive tone is measured as positive words divided 
by the total number of words in the annual report to control for document length (Feldman et al., 
2010; Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012; Davis et al. 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Arslan-
Ayaydin, Boudt and Thewissen, 2016; Yekini et al., 2016). 
   The current study focusses on positive tone in investigating the key factors that drive NDT as the 
majority of studies in the UK context argued that firms disclose more positive information than 
negatives (e.g., Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Smith and Taffler, 2010; Schleicher and Walker, 2010). 
Moreover, empirical research suggested that positive words are more accurate in measuring NDT as 
managers will not aim to use negative words voluntarily (Schleicher and Walker, 2010; Yekini et al., 
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2016). However, we use net tone (positive-negative) as a robustness test for our results to control for 
negativity.   
3.2 CEO narcissism measurement:  
    Measuring personal characteristics is very challenging, especially psychological traits such as 
narcissism (Ham et al., 2018). Narcissism in social science, leadership and psychology studies are 
commonly measured by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-40) developed by Raskin and 
Terry (1988). The NPI contains 40 pairs of statements of which the CEO must choose one for every 
pair in order to measure the level of narcissism. However, previous research has argued that it is the 
CEOs themselves who do this measurement so they may be biased in their choices; therefore, they 
decided to conduct different measures to capture narcissism. For instance, Ham et al., (2018) used 
CEO signature size as a proxy of narcissism. Moreover, a composite measure based on the CEO’s 
photo in the annual report, CEO’s relative cash pay and CEO’s relative non-cash pay were created as 
a measure of CEO narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Olsen et al., 2014).  
   However, we argue that the CEO compensation, cash pay and non-cash pay, represents the effort 
and expertise of a CEO, not his/her psychological characteristics. Alternatively, it might be better to 
use other measurements of narcissism, which reflect CEOs’ personalities, such as the use of first-
person pronouns in financial reporting which had been used in psychology literature to measure 
narcissism (Li, 2011; Alli et al., 2018). Moreover, sociolinguistics research supported this argument 
as first-person pronouns allow the provider of the message to link themselves to the good news, but 
the absence of first-person pronouns distances the provider from the bad news (Libby et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the current study uses the percentage of first-person pronouns in the CEO letter to 
shareholders as a proxy of narcissism. However, in our robustness checks we will follow Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, (2007) in  the use of the photo of the CEO in annual reports as a second proxy to 
capture narcissism, giving a score from 1 to 5 as defined in (table 1). Finally, other variables such as 
CEO characteristics, CG mechanisms and firm controls are defined in (table 1).   
(Table 1 near here) 
3.3 Empirical models:  
    We investigate the key factors that drive positive tone in UK annual report narratives using the 





 𝑃𝑜𝑠_𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐵_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐵_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          
                                                                                                                                              (1)                                                                                                             
    Pos_Tone is measured as positive words divided by the total number of words in the annual report 
to control for document length (e.g., Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012; Davis et al. 2015; Arslan-Ayaydin 
et al., 2016; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Yekini et al., 2016). Other variables in the model that 
capture CEO personalities and CG mechanisms are explained in (table 1). We control for firm 
characteristics as follows because they have been considered as important indicators for firm 
outcomes and strategies (Iatridis, 2016; Li, 2010). 
    Previous research recommended controlling for Firm_Size as large companies follow more 
conservative strategies to avoid any future risks, and they will be more cautious about disclosing 
balanced narrative reports (Li, 2010; Rogers et al., 2011). In addition, we consider financial leverage 
as a control of credit crunch (Yekini et al., 2016). We also control for other firm-specific 
characteristics that might affect positive tone such as Sales_growth, Profitability, Dividend and Book-
to-Market ratio as a proxy of growth, current profit, investment activities and firm value respectively 
(Li, 2010; Davis et al., 2015). FRC is a dummy variable equal 1 for years after the FRC narrative 
reporting guidance in 2014 in order to control for the regulatory guidance. In addition, we control for 
readability, using FOG index as another important characteristic of narratives because previous 
research has shown that it is correlated with narrative tone (Tan, Wang and Zhou, 2014). Finally, we 
control for year and industry fixed effect that might affect the positive tone of annual report narratives 
(Davis et al., 2015).  
   In order to investigate the effect of CEO narcissism on positive tone in UK annual report narratives, 
we use the following regression model:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠_𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑁𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝐴𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐵_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽10 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13 𝐵_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
                                                                                                                                             (2) 
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    CEO_NAR is measured based on the percentage of first-person pronouns in the CEO letter to 
shareholders, as mentioned above (e.g., Li, 2011; Libby et al., 2012). Following prior studies that 
investigated CEO narcissism (e.g., Olsen et al., 2014; Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019), we control for 
other CEO personalities, CG and firm features,  while Pos_Tone, other controls for CEO 
personalities, CG and firm-specific characteristics were measured as explained above in model (1). 
Moreover, we control for CEO_COMP as compensation is one factor that might affect CEO 
psychological features (Olsen et al., 2014). 
    Previous research has argued that even managers’ characteristics are important to investigate; 
however, the interactions within the top management team have implications for companies’ 
outcomes (e.g., Zhang, Ou, Tsui and Wang, 2017). Therefore, the following models (3) and (4) aim 
to investigate the interaction effects of top management team characteristics on positive tone in UK 
annual report narratives.  
   In model (3), we examine the moderation effect of board independence, as a proxy for strong CG, 
on the relationship between CEO narcissism and positive tone.  As explained above in the hypotheses 
development, strong CG mechanisms increase the governance-monitoring role of executives in order 
to improve financial reporting quality (Osma and Guillamo´n-Saorı´n, 2011).  
𝑃𝑜𝑠_𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑁𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑁𝐴𝑅 ∗ 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐴𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13 𝐵_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14 𝐵_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
                                                                                                                                          (3) 
    Where CEO_NAR*B_IND represent the interaction between narcissistic CEO and the percentage 
of independent directors on board Pos_Tone, other controls for CEO personalities, CG and firm-
specific characteristics were measured as explained above in model (1).    
    In model (4), we examine the moderation effect of board gender diversity on the relationship 
between CEO gender and positive tone. As explained above in the hypotheses development, a higher 
female percentage on board plays an important role in appointing a female leader for the company as 





 𝑃𝑜𝑠_𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗
𝐵_𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐴𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽12 𝐵_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                                                                                                       (4) 
CEO_gender is measured as a dummy variable, as mentioned in table (1) while CEO_gender*B_ 
gender diversity represent the interaction between CEO gender and the percentage of female directors 
on board. Pos_Tone, other controls for CEO personalities, CG and firm-specific characteristics were 
measured as explained above in model (1).   
4. Data:  
     The included companies in our sample are based on FTSE All-Share stock market Index. From all 
the list, we excluded 283 companies that operate in the financial services sector as they have different 
regulations, accounting practices and a different structure of financial statements compared with non-
financial companies (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). Moreover, we excluded 35 companies with 
missing data and PDF annual reports that were not transferable to text. Therefore, our final sample 
includes 224 listed companies in the London Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2018. We chose 2010 as 
a starting point for our sample to avoid the effect of the financial crisis in 2008. Moreover, by selecting 
this period we will be able to cover annual report narratives before and after the 2014 narrative 
reporting guidance issued by FRC. For these companies, we collected their available annual reports 
from Bloomberg and companies’ websites manually. This process ended by having 2,437 firm year 
observations.  
   It is worth mentioning that the current study focusses on the UK corporate annual report narratives 
as a unit of textual analysis after excluding the notes of financial statements and the external auditor 
report since the notes of financial statements are more descriptive and there are no opportunities for 
tone management in this section (Yekini et al., 2016). Moreover, we exclude the external auditor 
report because it does not represent corporate narrative reporting as it is written by an independent 
auditor from outside the company. 
    Finally, in order to investigate the key factors that drive NDT in the UK context, we collected the 
data about CEO personal characteristics, CG, firm financial characteristics and other control variables 
from Bloomberg. However, in the case of having missing data about CEO personal characteristics in 




5. Empirical results:  
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations:  
    Table (2) provides descriptive statistics of our variables in the current study. The mean value of 
Pos_Tone is 0.018, suggesting that UK annual report narratives have a positive sentiment. This value 
is in line with prior literature which measures positive tone scaled by the total number of words to 
control for document length (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012; 
Davis et al., 2015; Yekini et al., 2016). The average age of CEOs in our study is 53 years old; however, 
just 4.6% of the CEOs in our sample are females. These results are close to previous studies that 
investigated CEO characteristics (e.g., Ho et al., 2015). 20% of the CEOs in our sample have financial 
experience and 2.7% of the CEOs tended to be narcissistic. Moreover, we report that 60.8% of 
members on board are independent; however, there is just an average of 15% as females on board in 
our sample. The average of dividends per share (DPS) in our sample is 0.22, and the profitability 
based on ROE shows an average of 24.9. Moreover, the mean value of BTM ratio is 0.49, while the 
value of sales_growth in our sample is 8.24%. These previous results are consistent with prior studies 
in NDT (e.g., Li, 2010, Davis et al., 2015; Yekini et al., 2016; Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019).   
(Table 2 near here) 
    Table (3) presents the Person correlation between our variables in the current study. This 
correlation test provides an initial association between our variables and the key variable (Pos_Tone). 
Moreover, it sheds light on any potential multicollinearity. We found that CEO personal and 
psychological characteristics are significantly associated with positive tone in UK annual report 
narratives, which supports upper echelons theory that firms’ outcomes are predicted by their top 
managers’ characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In addition, we found a significant positive 
association between CEO_Compensation, firm_Size, ROE and sales_growth with CEO_narcissism. 
These results suggest that larger firms, firms with high performance and growth ratio, are more likely 
to appoint narcissistic CEOs with high compensations, which is in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019). Finally, the correlation between 
explanatory variables in the current study is relatively low, indicating that there are not any 
multicollinearity problems in our empirical models.    






5.2 Multivariable results and Discussion:  
    5.2.1 Key driving factors of positive tone:  
Table (4) presents the main empirical results of our OLS regression analysis. Column (1) shows the 
key factors that drive positive tone in the UK annual report narratives (model 1). We found that 
positive tone in annual report narratives is driven by different factors, named as CEO personalities, 
CG mechanisms and firm characteristics as these factors explain 19.32% of the changes in positive 
tone. We found CEO age is negatively and significantly associated with positive tone, with a 
coefficient of -0.0032 and t value of -1.91, supporting H1a that older CEOs display less positive tone. 
This is consistent with psychological research arguing that older individuals have more 
conscientiousness; therefore, they might provide a neutral and fair description for a firm’s 
performance (Ashton and Lee, 2016). Female CEOs  are negatively and significantly associated with 
positive tone, with a coefficient of -0.0081 and t value of -1.97, supporting H1b that female CEOs 
display less positive tone due to having a more ethical attitude in decision-making (Zalata et al., 
2018A). Financial expert CEOs are negatively and significantly associated with positive tone, with a 
coefficient of -0.0025 and t value of -1.39, supporting H1c that CEOs with financial experience 
display less positive tone, which is in line with prior literature showing that financial expert CEOs 
follow more conservative strategies (Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018). These previous results support 
upper echelons theory, which assumes that firms’ outcomes are predicted by their top managers’ 
characteristics.  
   Considering CG mechanisms as important factors that might drive positive tone in UK annual 
reports narratives, we found AC independence is negatively and significantly associated with positive 
tone, with a coefficient of -0.0028 and t value of -3.15, and thus supporting H3a that independent AC 
is negatively associated with positive tone. An independent board is negatively and significantly 
associated with positive tone, with a coefficient of -9.3206 and t value of -1.48, therefore supporting 
H3b, that an independent board is negatively associated with positive tone. In contrast with our 
expectation, we found a higher percentage of females on board is positively and significantly 
associated with positive tone, with a coefficient of 0.0025 and t value of 3.31. Therefore, we reject 
H3c, assuming that more females on board is negatively associated with positive tone. This can be 
explained as there is a small percentage of females on board in the UK context compared with prior 
studies that have been conducted in the US context. As it has been shown in the descriptive statistics, 
the mean of females on board is 15.58%. Therefore, maybe this percentage does not show the real 
effect of board gender diversity on board in the UK context. However, in general these results are 
consistent with prior studies showing that strong CG mechanisms play an important role in 
monitoring the financial reporting process (Iatridis, 2016; Zalata et al., 2018B).    
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    Moreover, we control for other CEO characteristics and firm-specific characteristics as important 
factors that might drive positive tone. We found CEO_Duality and CEO_founder are negatively and 
significantly associated with positive tone, while CEO_tenure is negatively associated with positive 
tone but it is not significant. Considering the readability of narratives as another important 
characteristic of narrative reporting, we found less readable (more complex) narratives are negatively 
and significantly associated with positive tone. That means when managers provide positive 
information they formulate it in a way that is easy to read. Firm size is negatively and significantly 
associated with positive tone, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Li, 2010:  
Marquez‑Illescas et al., 2019). Dividend per share, sales growth and profitability are positively and 
significantly associated with positive tone. These results indicate that higher performance and growth 
companies use more positive tone in their annual report narratives compared with other companies, 
in line with previous literature (e.g., Davis et al., 2015; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). In addition, we 
found UK companies display more positive tone after the FRC narrative reporting guidance in 2014, 
compared with the years before.  
    To investigate if multicollinearity problem affects the results in model (1), we calculate variance 
inflation factor (VIF). A commonly used value in previous literature that indicates strong or weak 
multicollinearity is VIF of 10; a VIF above 10 indicates strong multicollinearity (Chatterjee and Price, 
1991). The VIF score for this model is 1.64, and therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity problem 
does not exist in this model.  
     5.2.2 The effect of CEO narcissism on positive tone:  
Column 2 of table (4) presents CEO narcissism as a determinant of positive tone (model 2). We found 
that CEO narcissism is positively and significantly associated with positive tone, with a coefficient 
of 0.0041 and t value of 4.23, which supports H3 that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to use positive 
tone compared with non-narcissistic CEOs. This result is consistent with upper echelons theory, 
which assumes that narcissistic CEOs prefer bold actions, which attract attention, compared with non-
narcissistic CEOs, whether it results in big gains or big losses (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). It is 
noticeable that R2 increases by 1.13% from model (1) to model (2), which indicates the explanatory 
power of CEO narcissism on positive tone.   
It is worth mentioning that we control for other CEO personalities, CG mechanisms and firm 
characteristics, using the same variables as explained above in model (1) results, in our examining of 
the effect of CEO narcissism on positive tone. The VIF score is 1.61, and therefore, we conclude that 
multicollinearity problem does not exist in this model.  
(Table 4 near here) 
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    5.2.3 The moderation effects of CG:  
   Table (5) presents the moderation effect of CG on the relationship between CEO personalities and 
positive tone in the UK annual report narratives. Column (1) of table (5) shows the results for the 
moderation effect of board independence on the relationship between CEO narcissism and positive 
tone (model 3). While CEO narcissism remains positively and significantly associated with positive 
tone, with a coefficient of 0.013 and t value of 2.33, we found the interaction between CEO narcissism 
and board independence is negatively and significantly associated with positive tone, with a 
coefficient of -0.0015 and t value of -1.87. These results indicate that a higher independence level of 
the board reduces the positive association between CEO narcissism and positive tone. In other words, 
strong CG mechanism can control the positive tone of narcissistic CEOs. Therefore, these results 
support H2a that the positive effect of narcissistic CEOs on positive tone is lower when firms have a 
higher board independence percentage. The VIF score is 2.46, and therefore, we conclude that 
multicollinearity problem does not exist in this model. 
    Column (2) of table (5) shows the results regarding the moderation effect of board gender diversity 
on the relationship between CEO gender and positive tone (model 4). Female CEO remains negatively 
and significantly associated with positive tone with a coefficient of -0.0018 and t value of -2.20. We 
found the interaction between female CEOs and the percentage of females on board to be positively 
and significantly associated with positive tone, with a coefficient of 0.0065 and t value of 2.24. These 
results indicate that more females on board increases the negative association between female CEOs 
and positive tone. Therefore, these results support H1b1 that the negative effect of female CEOs on 
positive tone is higher in firms with a higher percentage of females on board. Moreover, these results 
are consistent with business ethics research suggesting that a higher percentage of females on board 
is associated with appointing a female leader in supporting their decisions as it reduces the gender 
gap effect between the CEO and the board of directors (Wang and Kelen, 2013). The VIF score is 
1.96, and therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity problem does not exist in this model. 
(Table 5 near here) 
5.3 Robustness test:  
5.3.1 Alternative measure for CEO narcissism:  
    In order to check the robustness of our results, we use a different measure for CEO narcissism in 
models (2) and (3). We used first-person pronoun usage as a proxy for narcissism in our original 
analysis and followed Chatterjee and Hambrick, (2007) in using the photo of the CEO in annual 
reports as an alternative proxy to capture narcissism and giving a score from 1 to 5 as defined in (table 
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1). Table (6) confirms our main results mentioned above as we found narcissistic CEOs are more 
likely to use positive tone in narrative reporting compared with non-narcissistic CEOs. However, this 
relationship is lower when the company has a higher independency level of board of directors. This 
confirms our hypotheses H2 and H2a that narcissistic CEOs have the desire to focus on positive tone 
in narrative reporting, however, strong CG mechanisms play an important role in monitoring CEO 
attributes towards positive tone.   
(Table 6 near here) 
5.3.2 Controlling for negative tone:  
    While we were focussing on positive tone in our main analysis as a proxy of NDT, we aimed to 
check the robustness of our results by using Net_Tone as a proxy of NDT, measured as (positive 
words-negative words)/total number of words. In other words, we aim to control for the negative tone 
in annual report narratives. Table (7) confirms our original results that NDT in annual reports is driven 
by different factors, named as CEO characteristics, CG mechanisms and firm characteristics. 
However, we found that the variables coefficient, t-value and R2 are lower compared with our main 
analysis when positive tone was used as a proxy of NDT. These results are not surprising as  they are 
in line with previous studies in the UK context reporting that NDT is more accurate if it is measured 
by positives rather than negatives as managers tend to bias the number of negative words (Schleicher 
and Walker, 2010; Yekini et al., 2016). Moreover, they reported that positive words are more in use 
and have more explanatory power than negatives in the UK context, especially when the principles-
based approach is operated with less restriction in monitoring financial reporting.  
(Table 7 and 8 near here) 
    In addition, table (7) as a robustness check shows that CEO narcissism is positively associated with 
Net_Tone; however, it is not significant. In other words, after controlling for negative tone, the 
significant relationship between narcissistic CEOs and NDT started to dissolve. This is not surprising 
as upper echelons theory suggests that narcissistic CEOs prefer bold actions, which attract attention 
by focussing on positives whether it results in big gains or big losses (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; 
Ham et al., 2018). Therefore, they focus only on positive tone, not negatives, to get more attention. 
Finally, as a robustness check for our results regarding the moderation effect of CG, table (8) confirms 
our main results that the moderation effect of CG mechanisms for the relationship between CEO 
characteristics and NDT is still statistically significant, even after controlling for negative words by 
using Net_Tone as a proxy of NDT. This means that strong CG mechanisms play an important role 
in having a balanced (not biased) narrative reporting style.     
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6. Conclusion:  
    This study aims to investigate the key factors that drive NDT in UK annual reports. While prior 
studies examined firm-specific characteristics as determinants of NDT (e.g., Li, 2010; Iatridis, 2016), 
the current study moves from firm-specific characteristics to top managers’ characteristics. We used 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist to employ a computerised content analysis for a sample of 
UK annual report narratives, 2,437 firm observations, in order to capture tone. Our results show that 
NDT is driven by the characteristics of CEOs and CG attributes as older CEOs, female CEOs and 
CEOs with financial experience display less positive tone in annual reports narratives. Moreover, we 
found companies with a high independence level of board of directors and audit committee have less 
positive tone. Additionally, narcissistic CEOs are more likely to use positive tone compared with non-
narcissistic CEOs, but the positive tone of narcissistic CEOs declines when firms have a higher board 
independence percentage. Moreover, we report that a higher percentage of females on board supports 
the attitude of female CEOs towards positive tone. Our results are robust due to the use of another 
proxy of CEO narcissism and controlling for negative tone.   
    We contribute to the debate on key factors that drive NDT by highlighting CEOs’ personalities, 
psychological features, financial experience and CG mechanisms as new dimensions of NDT 
determinants. Moreover, our studies show the role of strong CG in moderating the positive tone of 
CEOs. In addition, we contribute to NDT literature by providing evidence from the UK context where 
the principles-based approach is operated with less restriction in monitoring financial reporting 
compared with the US context. The current study has theoretical and practical implications. 
Theoretically, it provides supporting evidence for upper echelons theory, which states that strategic 
choices and firms’ outcomes are predicted by their top managers’ characteristics (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Practically, it informs analysts and investors about the characteristics of CEOs who 
are using more positive tone in their communication with external users through annual reports. 
Moreover, it shows policy makers the importance of having strong CG in monitoring financial 
reporting process. This study is not free from limitations. Firstly, because of data restrictions, we used 
secondary data to capture CEO narcissism. However, future research might use more direct measures 
such as NPI, as explained above. Secondly, while we focus on annual reports as one unit of textual 
analysis, future research might split it into different sections, to report about tone consistency in 
annual reports. Finally, this study focusses on the UK context; however, future research might 
compare the determinants of NDT between different countries that follow different CG regulatory 
settings.   
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Table (1): Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
Positive_Tone Number of positive words divided by the total number of words in 
annual report (to control for the length)  
Net_Tone Number of (positive words-negative words) divided by the total 
number of words in annual report. 
CEO Narcissism -Percentage of first-person pronounces in CEO letter to shareholders.  
-Score from 1 to 5 as follow:  
1: No photo of CEO 
2: CEO photo with other executives 
3: CEO photo alone and occupied less than half the page 
4: CEO photo alone and occupied more than half the page 
5: CEO photo occupied the whole page 
CEO Age The age of CEO at the end of fiscal year.  
CEO Gender Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is female and = 0 if the CEO is male.  
CEO Financial expertise Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has previous financial experience in 
either a banking or investment company, in a large auditing firm  
 or in a finance-related role (e.g., financial advisor, VP of finance, 
CFO); zero otherwise. 
CEO Tenure Number of years serving as CEO in the company 
CEO Duality Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, 
and =0 otherwise.  
CEO Founder Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company, and 
=0 otherwise 
CEO Compensation  Natural log for total salaries and bonuses that the CEO gets from the 
company. 
Board Size Total number of members in the board.  
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors in the board. 
Board Diversity Percentage of females on board of directors per year. 
AC Independence Percentage of independent members in the audit committee.  
32 
 
FRC Dummy variable =1 for the years after the Financial Reporting 
Council narrative reporting guidance (2015-2018) 
FOG Index As a measurement of readability = 0.4 [(words/sentences) +100 
(complex words/words)].  
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year.  
Firm Value Measured by BTM: Ratio of book value to share price at the end of 
fiscal year.   
Sales growth Change in sales relative to the previous fiscal year.  
Leverage Total liabilities over total assets.  
Profitability Return in Equity (ROE) measured as net income before dividends by 
the year-end common equity.  




















Table (2): Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Pos Tone 











CEO_Age 2437 53.1 6.58 32 79 
CEO_Gender 2437 .046 .209 0 1 
 CEO Finexp 2437 0.205 0.404 0 1 












 CEO Duality 2437 0.03 0.169 0 1 
 CEO Tenure 2437 6.14 5.72 0.083 41.5 
 CEO Comp 2437 14.196 0.841 9.876 18.069 
CEO_Fonder 2437 0.073 0.26 0 1 
 AC IND 2437 97.983 8.674 0 100 
 B_Diversity 2437 15.583 11.032 0 57.143 













 FOG 2437 21.671 2.98 14.122 83.406 
 Size 2437 7.209 1.70 2.323 12.927 
 Lev 2437 21.78 18.3 0 165.5 
 DPS 2437 0.22 0.34 0 3.07 
 BTM 2437 0.49 0.57 -5.45 12.08 
 Profit 2437 24.9 92.9 -345.6 240.9 





Table (3): Correlation Matrix 
VAR Pos Age gender FinExp NAR DUL Tenure COMP Found AC_IND 
pos 1          
Age -0.031* 1         
Gender -0.037* -0.065** 1        
FinExp -0.016 -0.078*** -0.034* 1       
NAR 0.042** 0.051** 0.050** -0.004 1      
DUL -0.038* 0.201*** -0.38* -0.023 -0.016 1     
tenure -0.037* 0.253*** -0.058*** -0.066** -0.016 0.082*** 1    
COMP 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.016 0.036* 0.326*** -0.055*** 0.091*** 1   
Found -0.092*** 0.142*** -0.062*** -0.017 -0.069*** 0.081*** 0.379*** 0.044** 1  
AC_IND -0.071*** 0.056** 0.028 0.041** 0.061*** -0.080*** 0.010 0.073*** -0.020 1 
B_Size 0.039* 0.049** 0.043** 0.051** 0.321*** -0.047** -0.029 0.366*** -0.018 0.053*** 
B_IND 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.046** 0.023 0.197*** -0.081*** -0.087*** 0.236*** -0.106*** 0.425*** 
B_div 0.156*** 0.096*** 0.205*** -0.023 0.228*** -0.041** -0.013 0.198*** -0.038* 0.144*** 
FOG -0.274*** 0.002 -0.036* 0.008 0.046** -0.023 -0.031 -0.024 -0.026 0.017 
Size -0.151*** 0.078*** 0.028 -0.025 0.380*** -0.037* -0.034* 0.287*** -0.051 0.050** 
Lev 0.029 -0.037* 0.029 0.156*** 0.039** 0.034* -0.121*** 0.018 -0.098*** 0.028 
BTM -0.139*** 0.065*** 0.029 -0.006 -0.089*** -0.047** -0.040** -0.072*** -0.018 0.008 
Profit 0.023 0.099*** -0.012 0.039* 0.028* -0.006 0.001 0.016 0.109*** 0.007 










VAR B_Size B_IND B_DIV FOG Size Lev BTM Profit S_grwth 
pos          
Age          
Gender          
FinExp          
NAR          
DUL          
tenure          
COMP          
Found          
AC_IND          
B_Size 1         
B_IND 0.133*** 1        
B_div 0.249*** 0.305*** 1       
FOG 0.026 -0.019 -0.010 1      
Size 0.340*** 0.242*** 0.094*** 0.043** 1     
Lev 0.116*** 0.058*** 0.103*** 0.039* 0.049** 1    
BTM -0.005 -0.017 -0.055*** -0.009 0.073*** -0.116*** 1   
Profit 0.022 0.003 0.092*** 0.026 -0.029 0.011 -0.178*** 1  
S_grwth -0.024 -0.019 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.015 -0.045** -0.008 1 




Table (4): Determinants of NDT 
Pos_Tone (1) (2) 


















































































Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2,437 2,437 
VIF 1.64 1.61 
R2 19.32% 20.45% 
*Significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  




Table (5): CG moderation effects: 





















































































Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2,437 2,437 
VIF 2.46 1.96 
R2 19.34% 19.62% 
*Significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  




Table (6): alternative measure of CEO narcissism: 

























































































Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2,437 2,437 
VIF 1.64 1.61 
R2 21.14% 21.42% 
*Significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  




Table (7): Robustness test for NDT determinants 
Net_Tone (1) (2) 


















































































Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2,437 2,437 
VIF 1.63 1.63 
R2 12.36% 12.74% 
*Significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  




Table (8): Robustness test for CG moderation effects 





















































































Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2,437 2,437 
VIF 3.29 1.94 
R2 12.14% 12.30% 
*Significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
Coefficient for each variable is reported, and t test values appear in brackets. 
